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In desirable cities, property owners and developers influence
tighter land use regulations, which can lead to substantially
higher urban and housing costs.
In the US and elsewhere, zoning policies and other land use regulations are now widespread.
Christian Hilber and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud look at the reasons behind these policies,
finding that, driven by lobbying from developers and property owners, places that are more
developed tend to adopt tighter land use regulations. With land regulations operating as a form
of ‘shadow tax’, of over 50 per cent of housing value in some cities, land regulations may now
have become too much of a barrier to development in urban areas.
Land use regulations vary tremendously in shape and scope across space and have
become more widespread and stringent over t ime. Although land use regulations have a long
history dating back to the 17th century at least, they were init ially pro-growth. Only one
century ago, hardly any country regulated land use systematically in a restrictive manner.
The f irst comprehensive zoning law in the United States, f or example, dates back to 1916
(in New York). In contrast, nowadays all modern states regulate land use intensively in an
overwhelmingly restrictive way.
Land use planning policies can,
in principle, raise welf are by
correcting market f ailures.
Recent evidence, however, casts doubt on this proposition and suggests that such regulations have strong
adverse net ef f ects: Turner, Haughwout, and van der Klaauw (2012) estimate the net cost of  land use
regulations as a proportion of  land value to reach a hef ty 38% in their sample of  residential plot
transactions across the United States. An earlier study by Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) estimates the net
costs of  land use planning policies in the UK to amount to as much as 3.9% of  annual household incomes.
So we are talking about big numbers.
These big numbers hide substantial heterogeneity. Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005) estimate that land
use regulations are akin to a ‘shadow’ tax that represents over 50% of  the values of  houses in Manhattan
and San Francisco, a f if th in DC and Boston, 12% in NYC or Salt Lake City, and zero in Detroit, Baltimore,
and Houston (see Table 1, col. [3]). Likewise, Cheshire and Hilber (2008) estimate the regulatory tax f or 14
Brit ish and 8 continental European of f ice locations. The average shadow tax, over the sample period,
amounts to a staggering 800% of  marginal construction costs in the London West End, 437% in Frankf urt,
97% in Newcastle, and 68% in Brussels.
This heterogeneous regulation of  land use begs the question: who benef its f rom tight land use controls? 
Prime suspects are land- and homeowners: by restricting supply, land use regulations raise house prices
and the price of  already developed land. In his inf luential book, William Fischel postulates that homeowners
elect local polit icians who implement policies that protect the value of  their most important asset – their
home. The so called ‘homevoter hypothesis’ implies that local regulations ref lect the wishes of  the majority.
Consequently, local jurisdictions that house a large f raction of  homeowners are predicted to be more
regulated than jurisdictions that host only a f ew; empirical evidence at the local level backs this hypothesis.
The bitter consequences of  higher house prices are f elt by newcomers, potential or real, who are
disenf ranchised. But disenf ranchised does not necessarily imply powerless.
In a recent paper (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013), we f ormalize a theory in which land use regulations
ref lect land based interests, more broadly def ined, f ollowing the pioneering work of  the sociologist Harvey
Molotch. These land based interests encompass those of  homeowners but also include those of  landlords
and those of  absentee landowners. This is consistent with the idea that planning boards are amenable not
just to the electorate but also to lobbying inf luence and to pressures f rom various interest groups. Solé-
Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2011) and Schone, Koch, and Baumont (2011) provide indirect empirical
evidence f or the relevance of  lobbying by land developers in Spain and France, respectively. The conviction
of  f ormer Baltimore mayor Sheila Dixon f or taking bribes f rom developers in 2009 suggests that such
pressures can also take malign f orms.
We also uncover novel evidence across US cit ies (Metropolitan Statistical Areas, or MSAs, in the jargon)
that the extent and breadth of  regulations is posit ively associated with urban development. The f ormer is
quantif ied by the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) computed by Gyourko, Saiz,
and Summers (2008) f or the 93 largest US MSAs in 2005; the latter is def ined as the f raction of  land in
1992 that is amenable to urban development (buildings and roads) that is actually put to urban use. Insof ar
as regulations increase the cost of  living, they reduce the equilibrium population and the share of
developed land relative to the laisser- f aire. Put dif f erently, this economic mechanism implies a negative
relationship between land use regulation and urban development. Yet, the data f or the US robustly
suggests otherwise (see Figure 1, panel a): the share of  developed land in 1992 is posit ively associated
with the extent of  regulation pertaining in 2005. A similar pattern was already visible in earlier data f rom the
late 1970s (see Figure 1, panel b): the share of  developed land in 1976 is posit ively related to a regulatory
index compiled f or the late 1970s.
Figure 1 – Unconditional correlation between regulatory restrictiveness and
share developed residential land
Our theory is consistent with this empirical f inding. In our f ramework, owners of  developed residential land
f avor additional land use constraints as this raises the price of  their land; owners of  undeveloped land
oppose such tightening because it increases the cost of  development. Mobile households evaluate
heterogeneous local amenities, such as access to a major ocean cost or January temperatures, and
housing costs (which also ref lect local regulation) and pick locations accordingly. The model leads to two
key equilibrium relationships: f irst, places with desirable amenities are more populated and their land is more
developed than that of  less desirable places. Second, places that are more developed adopt t ighter land
use regulations.  Table 1 and the patterns in Figure 1 provide casual evidence f or the posit ive relationship
between local amenities and the city-wide share of  developed land, and between the share of  developed
land and the extent of  land use regulation, respectively.
Table 1 – Development and Regulation Rankings for a subsample of
a selection of 21 US MSAs, 1990s
Using more comprehensive, systematic, and rigorous econometric techniques, we f ind that both theoretical
predictions are consistent with patterns we uncover in a cross-section of  93 major US cit ies. The ef f ect is
also quantitatively meaningf ul. To f ix ideas, compare Salt Lake City (the 56th most regulated MSA in our
sample) to San Francisco (16th). Salt Lake City has no access to a major ocean coast and its January
temperatures average 28.1°F. San Francisco has a border with the Pacif ic Ocean and its January
temperatures average 48.2°F. The implied dif f erence in the share of  developed land, as a consequence of
these disparit ies and their historical population densities alone (but keeping other observable dif f erences
constant), is 20 percentage points (1.6 standard deviations). That is to say, Salt Lake City’s share of
developed land would rise f rom its actual 23% to a hypothetical 43%, which nearly matches the 44% of  New
York City and Los Angeles! This, in turn, implies that granting Salt Lake City with San Francisco’s coastal
access, warmer winter temperature, and historical density alone hypothetically makes it the 35th most
regulated US city. In other words, these three variables enable us to explain half  the ranking gap in land use
regulations between the two cit ies.
The main takeaway f rom this is that households make location decisions based on natural amenities and
urban and housing costs. Land use regulations contribute substantially to these costs, and these
regulations are in turn the outcome of  the relative inf luence f rom competing property owner and land
developer pressure groups. The relative polit ical inf luence of  the two groups can be approximated by the
degree of  urban development. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with the most recent US data
across major cit ies. We interpret this f inding as suggestive evidence that local authorit ies and planning
boards respond to lobbying and other pressures in addition to welf are and electoral considerations. Our
f indings are also suggestive that regulation in highly desirable places such as New York and San Francisco
may be grossly over-restrictive.
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